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Abstract
This article examines the legality and wisdom of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(“NATO”) intervention in Kosovo in 1990. The Kosovo campaign pushed at the boundaries of in-
ternational law in at least two important respects. First, NATO’s decision to engage in large-scale
military action without prior Security Council authorization raised significant doubts about the
status of the law governing the use of force and the viability of United Nations (“U.N.”) primacy
in matters of international peace and security. Second, NATO’s high-altitude bombing campaign,
conducted without a single NATO combat casualty but with significant civilian casualties within
the FRY, called into question the appropriate relationship between means and ends in an interven-
tion designed to save lives. The long-term impact of the Kosovo intervention in each of these areas
of law remains uncertain.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") launched a massive seventy-eight day bombing cam-
paign to force the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY') to end
repression of Kosovo's predominantly ethnic Albanian popula-
tion and to accept NATO's terms for the resolution of Kosovo's
future political status. International lawyers have been debating
the legality and wisdom of the intervention ever since.'
The Kosovo campaign pushed at the boundaries of interna-
tional law in at least two important respects. First, NATO's deci-
sion to engage in large-scale military action without prior Secur-
ity Council authorization raised significant doubts about the sta-
tus of the law governing the use of force and the viability of
United Nations ("U.N.") primacy in matters of international
peace and security. Second, NATO's high-altitude bombing
campaign, conducted without a single NATO combat casualty
but with significant civilian casualties within the FRY,2 called into
question the appropriate relationship between means and ends
in an intervention designed to save lives.
The long-term impact of the Kosovo intervention in each of
these areas of law remains uncertain. It depends on whether fu-
ture cases generate similar responses, and on the reaction of
States generally to such responses. But one thing at least is clear.
NATO's intervention in Kosovo is part of and contributes to a
broader phenomenon, a loosening of the legal and political con-
straints on the use of force that is directly related to the end of
the Cold War.
* Professor, Cornell School of Law.
1. See Editorial Comments: NATO's Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824 (1999).
2. INDEP. INT'L COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT 94 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter THE Kosovo REPORT], available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/
thekosovoreport.htm (reporting that approximately 500 Yugoslav civilians were killed in
the bombing, and that no NATO service members were killed in action).
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I. NATO'S DECISION TO USE FORCE FOR
HUMANITARIAN ENDS
Past instances of humanitarian intervention-cases that can
plausibly be understood as a use of force to end grave human
rights abuses-have been few and far between.3 In most of these
cases, a single State has intervened in a neighboring country,
usually invoking a collective self-defense rationale, however im-
plausible such a claim might be.4 Such interventions have typi-
cally engendered one of two responses. Either most States have
condemned them as violations of international law, or most
States have tacitly accepted the interventions without probing
too deeply into their legal basis.5 Either way, the impact on in-
ternational law and institutions has been relatively marginal.
But the intervention in Kosovo was unique in two respects.
First, it was a collective action by the world's richest and most
powerful States, the States most directly associated with and in-
terested in the maintenance of the rule of law in international
affairs. Thus, the intervention could not be dismissed as a sim-
ple and transient breach of international law or the aberrant ac-
tion of a single State carrying little or no precedential value.
Second, the States involved made relatively little effort to shoe-
horn the intervention into the legal categories available under
the U.N. Charter for the use of force.6 The United States in par-
ticular did not advance a specific legal rationale for the interven-
tion, as it usually does when it engages in significant military ac-
tion. Instead, the United States articulated a series of contextu-
alized factors that in the U.S. view rendered the intervention
'Justified."7
These distinctive characteristics of the NATO intervention
created an irresolvable tension between the formal law of the
U.N. Charter and the actual practice of States whose conduct is
central to international lawmaking. The breach of the Charter
3. See Jules Lobel, American Hegemony and International Law: Benign Hegemony, Ko-
sovo and art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, I CHI.J. INT'L L. 19, 28 (2000) (discussing how self-
serving geopolitical interests, rather than humanitarian interests, often dictate a coun-
try's willingness to commit to humanitarian intervention).
4. See id. at 27.
5. See SEAN MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER (1996) (providing a thorough analysis of past cases).
6. See Thomas Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 857, 859 (1999).
7. See Lobel, supra note 3, at 27.
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was clear and apparent. NATO did not seek or receive Security
Council authorization, and it was not acting in self-defense. For
many international lawyers, the analysis ends there. But simply
labeling the intervention illegal is unsatisfactory. The authority
of international law rests on a reasonable congruence between
formally articulated norms and State behavior; when the two di-
verge too sharply, the former must adapt or lose their relevance.
The scope of the Kosovo operation, the identity of the partici-
pants, and the lack of a coherent legal rationale all combine to
render it difficult to dismiss the intervention as an anomaly with
no lasting impact on international law. But at the same time, the
continuing disagreement within NATO and among States gener-
ally over the legitimacy and desirability of unauthorized humani-
tarian intervention make it difficult to discern any clear change
or evolution in the law. The result is a persistent and disquieting
uncertainty.
It is easy enough to make the case that NATO's intervention
in Kosovo was illegal, and that such interventions should remain
illegal in the future. The U.N. Charter insists that any non-de-
fensive use of force must be approved by a Security Council
supermajority, including all of the Council's permanent mem-
bers.' In this way, the Charter guards against the possibility that
interstate violence might spiral out of control, since any decision
to initiate the use of force must garner an international consen-
sus, one that includes the assent or at least the acquiescence of
the major powers. Despite the Charter's concern for human
rights, its central purpose was, and is, to "save succeeding gener-
ations from the scourge of war."9 The Charter's design reflects a
simple but fundamentally important utilitarian calculus: the risk
of escalating interstate conflict inherent in any weakening of the
constraints on the use of force outweighs the possible benefits of
trying to carve out exceptions for cases of grave humanitarian
need that, for one reason or another, cannot generate the Secur-
ity Council consensus needed to authorize military intervention.
Against this strict positivist conclusion, it is possible to ad-
vance various indicia of legality that, taken together, might serve
to mitigate any condemnation of NATO's intervention on inter-
national law grounds. First, Belgrade's actions in the region cre-
8. See U.N. CHARTER art. 27, ch. VHI-VIII.
9. Id. pmbl.
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ated a clear threat to international peace and security, a threat
explicitly recognized in numerous Security Council resolu-
tions.1 ° In its efforts to combat the Kosovo Liberation Army
("KIA"), a group fighting for Kosovo's independence (and one
not above using terrorist acts to further its aims), FRY security
forces engaged in violent repression of ethnic Albanians in Ko-
sovo. Viewed in the context of recent Yugoslav history, the
events in Kosovo were alarming. After all, the Belgrade authori-
ties had already launched three wars on the territory of Bosnia,
Croatia, and Slovenia. In the process, Milosevic and his allies
had caused tens of thousands of deaths, wreaked untold eco-
nomic harm, and destabilized much of central Europe, while
earning indictments for themselves from the Yugoslavia war
crimes tribunal. Many officials in NATO countries believed that
Western reluctance to intervene early and forcefully in these
prior conflicts, and in particular in Bosnia, led to many
thousands of deaths that could have been prevented, and sub-
stantially raised the costs of Western intervention when it finally
took place.'1 In addition, many believed (mistakenly, as it
turned out) that Milosevic would back down in Kosovo if con-
fronted with a clear threat of NATO military action, or at most,
that Milosevic would endure a few days of relatively modest air
strikes before accepting NATO's terms.1 2 This view stemmed in
part from prior experience: Milosevic and Serb forces in Bosnia
quickly sued for peace after NATO bombed Serb military targets
in 1995. In retrospect, it became obvious that the two situations
were radically different, both in military and political terms, but
at least at the outset, NATO hoped that any actual use of force in
connection with Kosovo could be avoided or minimized.
Second, NATO action took place only after Belgrade's re-
peated failure to comply with pertinent Security Council resolu-
tions, and only after extensive diplomatic efforts failed.13 In a
10. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203 (Oct. 24, 1998).
11. See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President to KFOR
Troops (June 22, 1999), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/wh/new/html/
1990622h.html.
12. See Richard Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 847, 851 (1999).
13. See U.S. Dep't of State, Kosovo Chronology (May 21, 1999) [hereinafter Kosovo
Chronology], at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fskosovotimeline.html (pro-
viding a chronology of events in Kosovo that reflects the United States' efforts at negoti-
ations with the FRY).
2001] KOSOVO AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133
series of resolutions, the U.N. Security Council condemned Serb
violence and repression in Kosovo, demanded that the FRY ac-
cept a negotiated settlement to the conflict in keeping with the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE")
principles and Contact Group proposals, and imposed various
sanctions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to encourage
FRY compliance.14 In Resolution 1160, for example, the Council
demanded that Belgrade withdraw its "special police units and
cease [ ] action by the security forces affecting the civilian popu-
lation."15 Similarly, in Resolution 1199, the Security Council
again demanded that Belgrade cease hostilities and negotiate a
political settlement. The Council warned that "should the con-
crete measures demanded in this resolution ... not be taken...
additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in
the region" would be considered. 6
Throughout 1998 and the early part of 1999, the United
States and its allies, at times with the cooperation of the Russian
Federation and others, made numerous efforts to reach an
agreement acceptable to Belgrade. In October 1998, Milosevic,
facing the threat of NATO military intervention, agreed to with-
draw troops from Kosovo and to allow the OSCE's Kosovo Verifi-
cation Mission to send in 2000 observers to monitor the FRY's
treatment of ethnic Albanians." The Security Council approved
the agreement and demanded cooperation from both sides."
Before long, however, Belgrade renewed its military activity in
Kosovo. In response, the United States and other Western States
demanded that FRY and Kosovo Albanian representatives meet
in Rambouillet, France, for intensive negotiations on a compre-
hensive political settlement.' 9 After weeks of negotiations, the
talks broke down when Serb negotiators began to renege on pre-
viously accepted positions. Almost immediately, Serb forces re-
sumed military activities in Kosovo.2 °
Third, FRY actions shortly before the bombing presented
14. See Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828,
829-31 (1999).
15. S.C. Res. 1160 (Mar. 31, 1998).
16. S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 10.
17. See Kosovo Chronology, supra note 13.
18. S.C. Res. 1203, supra note 10.
19. See Kosovo Chronology, supra note 13.
20. See id.
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NATO with at least the possibility of a major humanitarian catas-
trophe. In the year preceding the March offensive, indiscrimi-
nate FRY assaults on areas controlled by the KLA drove
thousands of Kosovars from their homes.21 Admittedly, the larg-
est exodus did not occur until after NATO's bombing campaign
began, when 800,000 Kosovars were driven across the borders
into Albania and Macedonia as their homes and villages were
looted and torched, and as many as 10,000 were killed. But
NATO contends that the FRY simply took advantage of NATO's
intervention to accelerate a preconceived plan-"Operation
Horseshoe"-designed to pacify Kosovo by expelling most of its
ethnic Albanian population. The speed with which the opera-
tion was executed suggests that NATO may have been right.22
Fourth, NATO's action was not narrowly self-interested.
While concerns over regional stability played a major role, in ad-
dition to genuine fears for the security and rights of Kosovar Al-
banians, NATO did not act to impose a friendly regime, obtain
control over territory or resources, or otherwise pursue any of
the usual selfish aims often ascribed to States intervening under
a claim of humanitarianism. Thus, the fears of abuse that under-
lie most objections to legalizing humanitarian intervention were
not realized in Kosovo.
Finally, NATO's action commanded broad support in the
international community. The breadth of this support was re-
flected in the reaction to a draft Security Council resolution sup-
ported by China, Namibia, and Russia condemning the NATO
bombing. The draft was defeated by a vote of twelve to three.23
This vote, coupled with later Security Council resolutions in sup-
port of the political settlement reached at the end of the bomb-
ing campaign, reflect, if not implicit approval, at least after-the-
fact acquiescence by most members of the Security Council in
NATO's decision to intervene.24
21. See id. (noting announcement by United Nations ("U.N.") High Commissioner
for Refugees on September 29, 1998, that as many as 200,000 Kosovars had been dis-
placed by the fighting begun in February).
22. See Wedgwood, supra note 14, at 829 (arguing that evidence that Serbs began
the offensive prior to NATO action, and the speed with which 800,000 Kosovo Albani-
ans were deported, leads to reasonable belief that Belgrade had preconceived the
plan).
23. See id. at 831.
24. See id.; see also, Louis Henkin, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of
"Humanitarian Intervention," 93 Am. J. INr'L L. 824, 826-27 (1999) (suggesting that the
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All of these factors render NATO's decision to circumvent
the U.N. Security Council less troubling from an international
law standpoint than it might otherwise have been. But even col-
lectively, these factors do not bring NATO's action within the
formal law of the U.N. Charter. NATO deliberately did not seek
Security Council authorization for its action because it knew that
the Russian Federation would veto any authorizing resolution.25
But under the Charter, it was up to the Security Council, not
NATO, to determine whether conditions in Kosovo warranted
military intervention. NATO's actions may have furthered im-
portant human rights objectives and attracted support from
around the world, but if treated as lawful, would suggest that
other States and regional organizations may make their own uni-
lateral determinations on the need for force, with potentially
grave consequences for world order. One need only imagine
the Arab League intervening in Israel to prevent actual or antici-
pated mistreatment of Palestinians, or Russia intervening in the
Baltic states to protect the rights of ethnic Russians, to grasp the
risks.
But simply to characterize the intervention as illegal is un-
satisfactory. International law rests fundamentally on State prac-
tice. If key actors proceed without reference to a norm, and act
with general though by no means universal approbation, then
declaring the act illegal carries little weight. In such cases, the
States acting pay little or no political price except insofar as they
weaken a norm from which they ordinarily benefit. Moreover,
there may be future instances in which humanitarian concerns
clearly outweigh the need for adherence to the U.N. Charter's
precepts on the use of force.
With these considerations in mind, some scholars suggest
that NATO's action in Kosovo should be treated as an "accept-
able breach": an action contrary to formal treaty rules but desir-
able on humanitarian grounds and accepted, or even approved,
by most States; an action that necessarily loosens somewhat the
rules governing the use of force, but only modestly, given the
U.N. Security Council's after-the-fact ratification of Resolution 1244 is evidence of its
acquiescence in NATO's decision to intervene).
25. Cf Henkin, supra note 24, at 827 (arguing that the experience of Kosovo will
lead States or collectives to shift the burden of the veto, when they are confident of the
Security Council's acquiescence in contemplated intervention, by acting first and then
challenging the Security Council to terminate the action).
136 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:129
unique circumstances and the purposes for which force was
used.26
The notion of acceptable breach is an attractive one in
many respects. Even during the Cold War, States tended to ac-
cept, or at least ignore, isolated instances of military intervention
with predominantly humanitarian outcomes. For example,
Tanzania's intervention in Uganda, which ended the widespread
human rights abuses of the Idi Amin government, attracted little
criticism.
More recent regional interventions in West Africa also fit
into this pattern. In 1990, the Economic Community of West
African States ("ECOWAS") used force to end the civil war rag-
ing in Liberia; it neither sought nor received prior Security
Council authorization. Other States generally welcomed, or at
least acquiesced in, ECOWAS' decision to use force, and in sub-
sequent resolutions, the Council implicitly supported the inter-
vention.27 ECOWAS again used force without prior Security
Council authorization in 1996, this time to re-instate the ousted
President of Sierra Leone.28 Again, Security Council resolutions
implicitly ratified the intervention, but only after the fact. In
1991, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States carved
out safe havens for Kurds in northern Iraq; most States disagreed
with the legal rationales advanced, but nonetheless acquiesced
in the establishment of the safe havens. 29 Thus, the interna-
tional community and the Security Council have evinced an in-
creasing willingness in recent years to tolerate an occasional mili-
tary intervention, if the decision-making is multilateral, and the
purpose is genuinely humanitarian, even in the absence of prior
Security Council authorization.
26. See generally Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
203 (1974) (providing an early but incisive discussion of the pros and cons of the theory
of acceptable breach).
27. See Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in International
Conflicts, and the Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ.
333, 347 (1998); David Wippman, Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil
War, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 185-
86 (L. Damrosch ed., 1993).
28. See Levitt, supra note 27, at 347; Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The
Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention
in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 321 (1988).
29. See Lobel, supra note 3, at 29.
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Treating instances of genuinely humanitarian intervention
as acceptable breaches has the advantage of leaving the Charter
rules governing the use of force at least formally intact, while not
foreclosing occasional and exceptional cases in which interven-
tions are unauthorized but nonetheless desirable on human
rights grounds. As Ian Brownlie suggested many years ago, this
approach may be analogized to the practice of many States re-
garding euthanasia: it is tolerated as on balance desirable in
some cases, but not legalized for fear of undermining core prin-
ciples mandating respect for human life.3°
But the notion of an acceptable breach is something of an
oxymoron. If the action is genuinely acceptable, it seems inap-
propriate to maintain that it should also be unlawful, even if the
adverse consequences of treating it as a technical violation of the
law are minimal. To continue to treat such actions as unlawful
might inhibit States from acting in circumstances in which ac-
tion is warranted. 31 Moreover, giving a wink and a nod to hu-
manitarian interventions while maintaining that they are illegal
may undermine respect for international law generally.
In any event, it is uncertain whether NATO's action can be
fairly characterized as an acceptable breach. When ECOWAS ac-
ted in Sierra Leone and in Liberia, dissenting voices were few
and marginal. Other States could treat these interventions after
the fact as "peacekeeping operations," with relatively little cost to
the basic Charter norms governing the use of force.
But when major powers, such as China and Russia, both per-
manent members of the Security Council, vocally oppose an in-
tervention, it is hard to view it as falling within the acceptable
breach paradigm, since that paradigm assumes broad tolerance
of the intervention.
Moreover, it is debatable whether NATO's intervention fully
satisfies the kinds of criteria usually advanced by advocates of le-
galizing humanitarian intervention. Such criteria commonly in-
clude the existence, or at a minimum, the imminent existence of
widespread, grave human rights abuses involving substantial loss
of life; the reasonable exhaustion of non-forcible remedies; a
proportional use of force that is not likely to do more harm than
30. Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVEN-
TION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
31. Fonteyne, supra note 26.
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good; the minimum impact on existing structures of governance
consistent with accomplishing the humanitarian goals of the in-
tervention; and humanitarian motives, or at a minimum, con-
duct consistent with a predominantly humanitarian objective.
Although the FRY committed substantial human rights
abuses against Kosovar Albanians in the course of its struggle
against the KLA, it is doubtful whether prior to NATO's inter-
vention those abuses amounted to the kind of grave humanita-
rian emergency usually contemplated by advocates of humanita-
rian intervention. The U.N. Security Council did make note of a
"dire humanitarian" situation prior to the intervention, but
NATO's case rests in large part on the perceived need to avert
the large-scale ethnic cleansing NATO believed would follow the
collapse of the Rambouillet talks in the absence of a demonstra-
tion of Western resolve. NATO points to the mass expulsions
and the roughly 10,000 deaths that occurred after the bombing
started as proof that its concerns were well founded. In other
words, NATO's action was in substantial part an anticipatory hu-
manitarian intervention; it acted not so much to stop an on-go-
ing humanitarian catastrophe as to prevent one.3 2
It is, of course, far better to prevent atrocities than to re-
spond after the fact. And in this case, NATO can point both to
the general pattern of Belgrade's actions in the Balkans and to
past atrocities in Kosovo as supporting the need for strong action
immediately after Rambouillet's failure. Still, acting even in part
on anticipation of future atrocities complicates any assessment of
whether the threshold for emergency intervention has been met,
since it is impossible to know with certainty the extent to which
the anticipated abuses would actually have materialized in the
absence of intervention. Thus, some scholars have questioned
whether the abuses that followed Rambouillet would have oc-
curred in the same way and to the same degree in the absence of
NATO's commencement of its bombing campaign.33
Whether NATO exhausted diplomatic alternatives is also a
32. SeeJonathan Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 Am. J.
INT'L L. 834 (1999).
33. See, e.g., Richard Bilder, Kosovo and the "New Interventionism ": Promise or Peril?, 9
J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 153, 155 (1999) (questioning whether anger and revenge
prompted by the bombings were the motivating factors behind the atrocities and exo-
dus); Lobel, supra note 3, at 30 (discussing significant increase in the scale of ethnic
cleansing after the bombing began).
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subject of dispute. As noted earlier, the United States along with
other States engaged in extensive negotiations with the FRY cul-
minating in the talks at Rambouillet. But NATO also made de-
mands at Rambouillet that were difficult for any government to
accept. Among other things, NATO insisted on substantial au-
tonomy for Kosovo, with its final status to be determined at least
in substantial part by a referendum within three years, with inde-
pendence the almost certain result.3 4 Moreover, NATO insisted
that its forces should be permitted to move throughout the en-
tire territory of the FRY to oversee its compliance with the terms
being offered, something inconsistent with the FRY's constitu-
tion and ordinary conceptions of State sovereignty. 35
The FRYs refusal to accept these terms triggered NATO's
use of force. Yet when the conflict ended, NATO accepted terms
less demanding than those it proffered at Rambouillet. Under
the terms of the Military Technical Agreement and related
agreements entered into at the end of the fighting, Kosovo does
have near complete autonomy, but security is to be provided by
forces acting under U.N. auspices rather than under NATO's
control. It was understood that NATO would play a key role in
the implementation force, but that the force would also include
Russian troops. 7 Moreover, the peace agreement left open the
34. Rambouillet Agreement, available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/
ksvorambouillettext.html. Ch. 8, art. 1(3) of the Rambouillet text provides:
Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international
meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement
for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authori-
ties, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and
the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the
implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for
additional measures.
Id. Although this language does not explicitly provide for a binding referendum, the
United States told the KLA in writing that it interpreted the agreement as giving
Kosovars a right to determine their future by referendum. See UNITED KINGDOM HOUSE
OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE FOURTH REPORT 1999-2000 [hereinafter FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS CoMMIrrEE REPORT], available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-of-
fice.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2806.htm.
35. The Military Annex to the Rambouillet agreement provided that "NATO per-
sonnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free
and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associ-
ated airspace and territorial waters." FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note
34.
36. Military Technical Agreement, June 9, 1999, available at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/europe/janjune99/agreement_6-9.html.
37. THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 2, at 96.
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question of a referendum on the province's future.38 Thus,
some critics of the Rambouillet negotiations suggest that NATO
never expected Milosevic to accept its terms but went through
the motions in order to build support within the Alliance for
subsequent military action.39 While NATO may well have been
correct in concluding that further negotiations with Milosevic
would be fruitless, particularly given his record in initiating prior
Yugoslav conflicts, the judgment is necessarily a difficult one for
outside observers to make.
Some critics of NATO's intervention even question whether
NATO acted out of humanitarian motives, and whether it in fact
achieved humanitarian ends. It has been suggested variously
that NATO acted to preserve its credibility, to sustain its position
in Bosnia and elsewhere in the Balkans, to demonstrate its post-
Cold War relevance, to send a message to other States that chal-
lenging NATO carries risks, to avoid having to accept large num-
bers of refugees, or even to test modern weaponry and tactics.4"
While some of these suggestions are implausible, they illustrate
the difficulty of ascertaining motives, which can be varied and
complex, and which may change over time.
To some extent, the scope and intensity of the NATO inter-
vention may have reflected a miscalculation. NATO clearly de-
sired to end the escalating conflict between KLA and FRY forces.
Presumably, NATO wanted both to protect innocent Kosovars
and to avoid further destabilization of the region. From past ex-
perience, NATO could reasonably have believed that firm mea-
sures taken early might avoid a protracted and costly later in-
volvement. NATO might also reasonably have concluded that a
united front and a demonstrated willingness to use force would
quickly force Milosevic to accept substantial autonomy for Ko-
sovo and bring the crisis to a relatively prompt close.4
Once committed, NATO had little choice politically but to
stay the course. When Milosevic refused to accept NATO de-
mands at Rambouillet, NATO could not simply back down. Hav-
38. Id. at 271.
39. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM117EE REPORT, supra note 34, at 66-67.
40. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 33, at 156; see also FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE RE-
PORT, supra note 34, para. 72.
41. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, paras. 106-11 (indicat-
ing that NATO expected Milosevic to back down quickly when confronted with the use
of force).
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ing repeatedly threatened to use force, NATO had little choice
but to do so. At that point, NATO's credibility was indeed "on
the line," as various NATO officials emphasized.4 2 It is doubtful
whether NATO would have put itself into this position had it
anticipated that Milosevic would attempt to outlast a NATO
bombing campaign rather than quickly yield once it began. But
having started, NATO had little choice but to continue until Bel-
grade capitulated.
Yet the bombing campaign was not well suited to the hu-
manitarian purpose that provides its principal justification. As
discussed below, the manner in which NATO military action was
conducted rendered NATO largely unable to prevent ethnic
cleansing on the ground. And some observers contend that the
bombing itself helped trigger the kinds of abuses NATO was
hoping to prevent. It is undisputed that the FRY greatly ex-
panded its campaign against Albanian Kosovars once the bomb-
ing started. What is disputed is whether and to what extent the
FRY's post-bombing atrocities constituted a response to the
bombing rather than a pre-conceived plan that would have been
carried out regardless of NATO's air assault. According to a re-
port prepared by the U.K. House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee:
It is likely that the NATO bombing did cause a change in the
character of the assault upon the Kosovo Albanians. What
had been an anti-insurgency campaign-albeit a brutal and
counter-productive one, involving atrocities such as that at
Racak in January 1999-became a mass, organised campaign
to kill Kosovo Albanians or drive them from the country.
This was partly because of the Serbs' reaction to the bombing,
and partly because the launch of the campaign required that
the OSCE monitors be withdrawn, thereby removing one of
the obstacles to action against the Kosovo Albanians.4"
42. See id. paras. 72-74.
43. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, para. 87. The Indepen-
dent International Commission on Kosovo reached a similar conclusion:
We cannot know what would have happened if NATO had not started the
bombing. It is however certainly not true that NATO provoked the attacks on
the civilian Kosovar population-the responsibility for that campaign rests en-
tirely on the Belgrade government. It is nonetheless likely that the bombing
campaign and the removal of the unarmed monitors created an internal envi-
ronment that made such an operation feasible. The FRY forces could not hit
NATO, but they could hit the Albanians who had asked for NATO's support
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NATO contends that the expulsion campaign would have
occurred even in the absence of NATO military action.4 4 But
even if there was a causal link, on balance the human rights situ-
ation in Kosovo nonetheless ultimately improved as a result of
NATO action. For the foreseeable future, at least, Kosovar Al-
banians are free to exercise substantial self-governance and need
not fear repression or harassment in the exercise of their politi-
cal rights. Serbs in Kosovo face a much bleaker situation, but
can at least claim the protection of an international security
presence.
What becomes apparent from a close look at the Kosovo op-
eration is that it is not a textbook case of humanitarian interven-
tion. NATO's action was not a direct and immediately effective
response to a sudden eruption of genocidal violence. Instead,
the circumstances were more complicated and more nuanced.
NATO's objectives were multiple and varied over time, and the
effects of its actions were mixed. Overall, it appears that NATO
did act in Kosovo for predominantly humanitarian reasons and
that it did ultimately achieve important humanitarian ends. This
may be the most we can reasonably expect of any group of States
prepared to use force for other than selfish interests. Still, the
subjective nature of the humanitarian calculus in Kosovo makes
it an ambiguous precedent. Thus, we are stuck for the time be-
ing in an uncomfortable limbo. It may be that the law in this
area will and should evolve in a common-law fashion-that by
cumulating experience from past cases with experience gained
in future cases, criteria will emerge permitting us to distinguish
lawful and unlawful interventions undertaken in the name of hu-
manitarianism. But it might also be the case that unauthorized
interventions reasonably characterized as humanitarian will be
too sporadic, and too contested in their circumstances, to gener-
ate a meaningful rule. In other words, we may be stuck in limbo
indefinitely.
and intervention. It was thus both revenge on the Albanians and a deliberate
strategy at the same time.
THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 2, at 31.
44. The FRY had clearly planned for the possible mass ethnic cleansing of Kosovo.
As the Independent International Commission on Kosovo observed, "it is very clear that
there was a deliberate organized effort to expel a huge part of the Kosovar Albanian
population and such a massive operation cannot be implemented without planning and
preparation." See id.
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One response to the uncertainties surrounding humanita-
rian intervention is to improve the capacity of different actors to
undertake such interventions while structuring a decision-mak-
ing process that will minimize the risk of abuse. By doing so, it
may be possible to increase the probability that the U.N. Security
Council will authorize intervention in appropriate cases and the
probability that States will be prepared to intervene. The British
and Dutch governments have been working to persuade mem-
bers of the U.N. Security Council to consider developing criteria
to identify situations in which the permanent members would
agree to refrain from exercising their veto.4' This effort can be
seen as an attempt to render the U.N. institutionally better able
to deal with genuine humanitarian emergencies.
More important, however, and more practical, are efforts to
strengthen the U.N.'s peacekeeping and peace enforcement ca-
pabilities. The U.N. and various individual member States have
devoted extensive attention to this issue, partially as a result of
perceived U.N. failures in maintaining and enforcing peace in
places such as Somalia and Bosnia. A thorough analysis pre-
pared by a team of experts under the direction of veteran U.N.
diplomat, Lakhdar Brahimi, has identified numerous areas for
reform, and the U.N. is in the process of reviewing and imple-
menting many of the Brahimi recommendations.4 6
For the most part, though, the U.N. is not equipped or in-
clined to undertake large-scale coercive military interventions.
The culture of U.N. peacekeeping continues to insist on seeking
to maintain neutrality with respect to warring parties, and most
countries contributing troops lack the capacity for more aggres-
sive peace enforcement operations.47 When force is needed to
compel the termination of atrocities or the cessation of hostili-
ties, the U.N. must ordinarily rely either on an individual State
(such as France, which belatedly intervened in Rwanda in 1994)
or a coalition of the willing (as in Bosnia, where NATO joined
with other States to end the fighting in 1995).
Recognizing the U.N.'s limitations in this field, various re-
gional organizations have begun to develop their own institu-
45. Author's interviews with British and Dutch government officials.
46. Report of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, A/55/305 - S/2000/809 (2000),
available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace-operations/.
47. Author's interviews with U.N. peacekeeping officials.
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tional capacities to engage in humanitarian and other forms of
intervention. The European Union ("EU"), for example, is
working to build a crisis response capability under the rubric of
the European Security and Defense Initiative ("ESDI"). 4 This
initiative is intended to give the EU a significant military force
capable of rapid deployment in crises, which could be used for
humanitarian intervention among other things. The EU has yet
to devote the resources that would be necessary to make ESDI a
reality, but it has at least started down that road. Similarly, the
recently formed African Union ("AU"), which is modeled on the
EU, includes conflict prevention and management among its
central aims.49 The AU is seeking to develop its own crisis re-
sponse capabilities.
One of the most interesting developments in this regard is
the 1998 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Con-
flict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Se-
curity.5" This Protocol established a Mediation and Security
Council that "shall . . .authorise all forms of intervention and
decide particularly on the deployment of political and military
missions" when the conditions for application are met.51 These
conditions include interstate aggression, but also cases of inter-
nal conflict "that threaten[ ] to trigger a humanitarian disaster,"
that involve "serious and massive violations of human rights and
the rule of law," or that involve "an overthrow or attempted over-
throw of a democratically elected government."52 To this end,
the Protocol obligates member States to designate military units
to be available on a stand-by basis for fulfillment of the Proto-
col's aims.
The extent to which the Protocol is designed to enable and
even require member States to act in the absence of Security
Council authorization or the consent of the target State is un-
clear. But ECOWAS has already intervened without Security
Council authorization in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and found its
48. See NATO Fact Sheet, Strengthening European Security and Defense Capabilities,
Dec. 15, 2000, at http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/dev-esdi.htm.
49. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 9 (2001), available at http://
www.oau-oua.org/LOME2000/Africa%2OUnion%2Constitutive%2Act%20ENG.htm.
50. See Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management,
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, available at http://www.ecowas.int/.
51. Id. art. 10.
52. Id. art. 25.
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actions generally welcomed. Moreover, ECOWAS has concluded
that humanitarian emergencies in member States invariably spill
over into neighboring States and jeopardize regional security
generally. ECOWAS has also concluded that it cannot rely on
the U.N. to intervene effectively in such cases, and so it must be
prepared to shoulder much of the burden itself.
Unfortunately, ECOWAS lacks the financial, political, and
logistical resources necessary for effective interventions. In both
Liberia and Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring
Group ("ECOMOG"), ran into serious problems and was itself
responsible for grave human rights abuses." But other States
could, at least in theory, provide much of the assistance needed
to render ECOMOG into a more effective and disciplined force,
which might then play a very positive role in resolving humanita-
rian emergencies in the region. In that event, the Security
Council might be much more willing to authorize ECOWAS mil-
itary intervention in the first place.
But strengthening institutional capacity, though it may in-
crease the probability of securing Security Council authorization
in cases of marginal interest to the permanent members of the
Council, will not resolve the dilemma posed by future Kosovos,
where Council members have important but divergent interests.
To the extent that such cases arise in the future, the normative
tensions created by the Kosovo intervention will either deepen,
or come to some kind of eventual resolution as yet unforesee-
able.
What is clear now is that the restraints on the use of force
have lessened. NATO's intervention in Kosovo would have been
unthinkable during the Cold War. But the danger that compet-
ing interventions might escalate to a superpower nuclear con-
frontation has receded. Accordingly, NATO had space to act
that did not exist before. Within limits, that freedom extends to
other uses of force. The vigorous military response of the
United States and its allies to the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon reflect a broad interpretation of the
right of self-defense. The U.S. view of self-defense in this context
has been accepted by most States, though it would have gener-
ated vigorous controversy if the assault on Afghanistan had taken
place a dozen years ago. This loosening of the constraints on
53. See Levitt, supra note 27; Wippman, supra note 27.
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the use of force may, within limits, represent an inevitable and
even desirable response to the changed conditions following the
Cold War. But we should be wary that the core principles of the
U.N. Charter's approach to the use of force are not too rapidly
and extensively eroded.
II. HUMANITARIAN LAW IN HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
The manner in which NATO used force in Kosovo has at-
tracted almost as much scrutiny as the decision to use force in
the first place. NATO fought an extraordinary "zero-casualty"
war. "Force protection" dominated NATO military planning.
The goal was to force Belgrade to accept NATO's terms while
minimizing NATO casualties.
To accomplish this goal, NATO engaged in week after week
of high-altitude aerial bombardment, concentrating first on the
suppression of FRY air defenses, and then on FRY military capa-
bilities within Kosovo. 4 Much of the assault was conducted us-
ing precision-guided munitions, which limit the unavoidable risk
of "collateral damage." In general, NATO went to great lengths
to ascertain that its targets constituted legitimate military objec-
tives, using a complex process requiring the assent of multiple
decision makers from different States. Military lawyers able to
pull up the Geneva Conventions on their computer screens par-
ticipated in the target selection process.
Unfortunately, Milosevic did not back down after a few days
of air attacks, as he was expected to do. Instead, his forces inten-
sified the "ethnic cleansing" of Kosovo, killing many civilians in
the process. High-altitude air strikes, while shielding NATO pi-
lots from anti-aircraft fire, were of little utility in stopping the
ethnic cleansers on the ground. Only ground troops supported
by low-flying planes and helicopters could have fulfilled that
role, and NATO was unwilling to expose its forces in that way.
Moreover, NATO's air raids killed hundreds of civilians in the
FRY, including some of the Kosovars that NATO had intervened
to protect.55 And as the campaign wore on and Milosevic
showed no signs of yielding, NATO increasingly opted to "go
54. See THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 2.
55. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN, Feb. 2000,
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/.
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downtown," that is, to attack "dual-use" facilities serving both
military and civilian needs. Such facilities included FRY electri-
cal power, telecommunications, and transportation infrastruc-
ture.56 The result was considerable hardship for the civilian pop-
ulation of the FRY.
57
Many human rights groups, most notably Amnesty Interna-
tional, were sharply critical of the NATO military campaign."
Mary Robinson, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
suggested that all sides to the conflict in Kosovo, including
NATO, should be subject to investigation for violations of inter-
national humanitarian law.5 9 A special committee from the Pros-
ecutor's office of the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia ("ICTY") conducted a review of NATO opera-
tions, and ultimately concluded that the facts did not justify
proceeding with any prosecution.6 ° The ICTY's conclusion was
not an endorsement of NATO tactics. Instead, the committee
decided that there was insufficient evidence of intentional crimi-
nal acts to justify further investigation. From the standpoint of
the committee, it was evident that NATO's actions were not com-
parable to the kinds of large-scale, deliberate crimes that the
ICTY was set up to prosecute.
Whether every dual-use facility attacked by NATO consti-
tuted a legitimate military target is a more difficult issue. The
law in this area is relatively vague, and different actors can in
56. See Kosovo Report, supra note 2.
57. Id.
58. See AMNESTY INT'L, NATO/FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, "COLLATERAL
DAMAGE" OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS? VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY NATO DURING
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/kosovo/;
HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 55.
59. See Robinson Attacks NATO Campaign, BBC NEWS, May 9, 1999, available at http:/
/news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_339000/339562.stm.
60. See FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO RE-
VIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA,
available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm. According to the Com-
mittee,
"[o]n the basis of the information reviewed, however, the committee is of the
opinion that neither an in-depth investigation related to the bombing cam-
paign as a whole nor investigations related to specific incidents are justified.
In all cases, either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely
to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges
against high level accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous
offences."
Id. para. 90.
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good faith reach different conclusions about the military value
of a particular target and therefore the legitimacy of attacking
it." But allowing for differences of interpretation, it seems clear
that the ICTY Committee's decision to forego further investiga-
tion was the correct one.
The more interesting theoretical question is whether, as a
number of scholars have suggested, NATO should be held to a
higher standard in its conduct of military operations than inter-
national humanitarian law ordinarily requires. 62 From the stand-
point of humanitarian law, the suggestion seems misplaced. Hu-
manitarian law applies to all cases of armed conflict, without re-
gard to the motivations of the combatants or the legality of their
decision to resort to force. It would be peculiar, even perverse,
to conclude that the rules of humanitarian law should apply
more stringently to those forces intervening for humanitarian
ends than to those engaged in ethnic cleansing and similar
atrocities. Doing so would handicap the wrong side, the forces
intervening to assist a beleaguered population.
Instead, the possibility of injuries to civilians should be fac-
tored into the decision to use force in the first place. The ulti-
mate justification for humanitarian intervention is the protec-
tion of innocents from grave harm. No intervention should be
undertaken in the first place if the intervenors cannot be reason-
ably confident that they can achieve that objective at an accept-
able cost, and harm to civilians must be a major component of
that calculus.
NATO almost certainly could have lessened civilian casual-
ties and perhaps prevented or at least moderated the mass ex-
pulsion of Kosovars that followed the onset of the bombing cam-
61. As the Independent International Commission on Kosovo observed, some of
NATO's targeting decisions were
.questionable under the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, but it must be
acknowledged that State practice in wartime since World War II has consist-
ently selected targets on the basis of an open-ended approach to 'military ne-
cessity,' rather than by observing the customary and conventional norm that
disallows deliberate attacks on non-military targets. It must also be noted that
the NATO campaign was more careful, in relation to its targeting, than was
any previous occasion of major warfare conducted from the air."
See THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 2.
62. See, e.g., id. (arguing that in humanitarian interventions, "[t]here must be even
stricter adherence to the laws of war and international humanitarian law than in stan-
dard military operations. This applies to all aspects of the military operation, including
any post cease-fire occupation.").
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paign, if NATO had been prepared and willing to use ground
troops at the outset. But NATO was neither logistically nor polit-
ically prepared to use ground troops, and publicly said so.
NATO leaders had decided that public opinion in key member
States would not support a sustained intervention unless NATO
could keep coalition casualties to an absolute minimum. As a
result, NATO did not seriously consider a ground assault until
well into the bombing campaign.6" Thus, political imperatives
drove military decision-making. It is easy to criticize this result,
but one has to ask whether the alternative-no intervention or
breaking off the intervention before it achieved its aims-would
have been preferable. It is unlikely NATO would have started
any military action if it had thought ground troops would be nec-
essary.
Looking at Kosovo after the fact, it is possible to criticize the
conduct of the operation for failing to maximize its humanita-
rian potential, and for doing so in ways that placed such a com-
paratively high value on the lives of coalition forces as opposed
to the lives of civilians on the ground. But it does not follow that
the laws of war should apply more strictly to humanitarian inter-
venors. Doing so would only render interventions in places like
Kosovo less likely. Governments in developed democratic States
are accountable to their citizens, and find it hard to maintain
support for any military action entailing casualties unless clear
national interests are at stake. It follows that such States will re-
fuse to engage in humanitarian intervention unless they can do
so at little risk to their own personnel. This may be unfortunate,
but it is a fact that characterizes Western involvement in humani-
tarian endeavors from Somalia to Bosnia to Kosovo. We should
be careful to ensure that the best does not become the enemy of
the good. If on balance interventions such as NATO's in Kosovo
further important human rights objectives, then tightening the
rules of war for humanitarian intervenors would be counter-
productive.
CONCLUSION
Any judgment regarding the success or desirability of
63. FOREIGN AFFAIRS CoMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 34, paras. 112-15 (noting the
prospect that NATO might in the end be forced into a ground assault may have contrib-
uted significantly to Milosevic's decision to yield).
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NATO's intervention in Kosovo necessarily rests on unprovable
assumptions. We can only speculate on what would have hap-
pened had NATO refrained from intervening. It seems proba-
ble, though, that the violence in Kosovo would have escalated,
with potentially grave repercussions for the entire region. It may
be that the intervention had its own destabilizing influence,
prompting ethnic Albanians in Macedonia to pursue their own
demands for independence. But as a result of its intervention in
Kosovo, NATO has been forced to work towards stabilizing not
only Kosovo, but also Macedonia, and now, with the fall of
Milosevic, the FRY itself. NATO's efforts appear to have yielded
considerable benefits, and there is reason to hope that the situa-
tion in the region will continue to improve. On balance, then, it
seems likely that both Kosovo and the region are better off than
they would otherwise have been.
Unfortunately, NATO's objectives could only be pursued by
circumventing the U.N. Charter's framework for the use of
force, and by adopting a zero-casualty approach that lessened
significantly the potential humanitarian benefits of the opera-
tion. Moreover, as noted, the long-term costs and benefits of the
intervention are necessarily speculative. From an international
law standpoint, Kosovo therefore remains an ambiguous prece-
dent; given the extraordinary circumstances that generated
NATO's use of force, Kosovo may also be an anomalous event.
But NATO's willingness to use force outside the framework of
the U.N. Charter already has contributed to a political climate in
which States are unlikely to interpret the Charter's restrictions
on the use of force as narrowly in the future as they have in the
past.
